Market directory
Markets: where these structures are permitted, constrained or closed
The instrument set is global; its legality is local. Of 58 markets screened, 12 are permissive, 32 are constrained and 14 are closed to a convertible whose conversion price is referenced to future market prices, or to a standby equity facility. What differs is not the instrument but the pricing floor, the vote, the capacity cap and the resale path.
Key takeaways
- Only 12 markets are permissive. The United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Australia and Singapore. Everywhere else the structure is modified or unavailable.
- Closed is usually a formula, not a ban. India, China and Taiwan each prescribe a minimum price computed from a past trading average, which a price that refixes downward can never satisfy.
- Par value closes more markets than regulators do. Germany, Greece, Romania, Kuwait and Colombia floor the issue price at nominal value, which for a fallen small cap sits above the market price.
- Resale is a separate screen. Israel blocks privately allotted stock for six months and then meters it over six quarters; Taiwan freezes it for three years; Vietnam for one to three.
- Permissive is not the same as uncontroversial. The AMF in France, the FSMA in Belgium and Consob in Italy have each published findings on severe dilution among issuers that used these structures.
What was screened, and how
Every market was put to the same four questions, and each answer had to come from a regulator, a rulebook or a statute.
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Does a floating conversion price exist here?
Whether a convertible security may carry a conversion price referenced to future market prices, rather than fixed at issuance.
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Does a standby equity facility exist here?
Whether an investor may subscribe for new listed shares on the company's demand, over time, at a price set at each drawdown.
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Which specific rule governs?
Placement capacity, pre-emption, a pricing floor, a maximum discount, an approval threshold, a dilution cap or a lock-up, named and cited.
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How does the stock become tradable?
The path and its conditions: registration, admission, prospectus thresholds, holding periods, and any repatriation gate behind them.
Three verdicts follow. Permissive means the structure works substantially as intended, subject to normal capacity and disclosure rules. Constrained means it works only with a material modification: a hard pricing floor, a capped discount, a mandatory vote, a dilution ceiling or a lock-up. Closed means market-referenced pricing is effectively unavailable, or that capital controls and foreign-ownership rules make the structure impractical for an outside investor. The screen itself, with its sources, its tier for every market and a confidence flag recording how much of the underlying law was read in primary form, is published as the market screen data file.
The verdicts are not spread evenly. The permissive tier is the smallest of the three and it is regionally concentrated: no market screened in the Middle East, in Africa or in East Asia is permissive, and no market in Europe is closed. Twelve markets clear the screen substantially intact; the other 46 need either a modification or a different instrument.
The tier table
Every market, its venues, its regulator, its tier, and the one rule that decides it.
| Market | Venues | Regulator | Tier | The rule that decides it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Nasdaq, NYSE, NYSE American, OTC Markets | SEC | Permissive | Nasdaq Rule 5635(d): a vote for a 20% Issuance below the Minimum Price |
| Canada | TSX, TSXV, CSE | CSA | Constrained | TSXV Policy 4.1 s.3.3(a): conversion price never below Market Price |
| Brazil | B3 | CVM | Constrained | Lei 6.404 art. 170: the issue price must be justified against dilution |
| Mexico | BMV, BIVA | CNBV | Constrained | LGTOC art. 210-bis: convertible obligations may not be placed below par |
| Chile | Bolsa de Santiago (nuam) | CMF | Closed | Ley 18.046 art. 25: a 30-day preferential offer over any convertible |
| Colombia | BVC (nuam) | SFC | Closed | Código de Comercio art. 386: the reglamento must state a price |
| Peru | BVL (nuam) | SMV | Constrained | Ley 26887 art. 259: pre-emption lifted only by an open-company vote |
| Argentina | BYMA, MAE | CNV, BCRA | Constrained | Ley 23.576 art. 12: pre-emption suppressed only on a 50% and 5% vote |
| United Kingdom | LSE Main Market, AIM, Aquis | FCA | Permissive | CA 2006 s.560: pre-emption is tested once, at grant of the conversion right |
| Ireland | Euronext Dublin, Euronext Growth | Central Bank of Ireland | Permissive | CA 2014 s.1023(7): a directors' statement must justify the amount to be paid |
| Germany | Frankfurt, Xetra, Scale | BaFin | Constrained | AktG s.186(3): 20% of capital, and not materially below the exchange price |
| France | Euronext Paris, Growth, Access | AMF | Permissive | C. com. L.22-10-52: the board may fix the price freely on delegation |
| Netherlands | Euronext Amsterdam, Growth | AFM | Permissive | Pre-emption excluded by the meeting or a designated board; Civil Code text not read |
| Belgium | Euronext Brussels, Growth | FSMA | Constrained | CCA art. 7:193: special board and auditor reports filed with the FSMA |
| Luxembourg | LuxSE, Euro MTF | CSSF | Permissive | Authorised capital in the articles, EU-capped at five years; 1915 Law text not read |
| Switzerland | SIX Swiss Exchange, BX Swiss | FINMA, SIX | Constrained | CO art. 653c(3): advance subscription rights lifted only on appropriate conditions |
| Austria | Wiener Borse | FMA | Constrained | AktG s.153(3): a three-quarters vote, with no simplified exclusion route |
| Sweden | Nasdaq Stockholm, First North, Spotlight, NGM | Finansinspektionen | Permissive | ABL 15 kap.: the only floor is quota value; each directed issue must be justified |
| Norway | Oslo Bors, Euronext Expand, Euronext Growth | Finanstilsynet | Permissive | Allmennaksjeloven s.10-14: board authority capped at 50% for two years |
| Denmark | Nasdaq Copenhagen, First North | Finanstilsynet | Constrained | Selskabsloven s.169(2): the resolution must state a tegningskurs |
| Finland | Nasdaq Helsinki, First North | FIN-FSA | Constrained | LLCA 9:4(1): a directed issue needs a weighty financial reason |
| Iceland | Nasdaq Iceland, First North | Central Bank of Iceland | Constrained (provisional) | Act 2/1995 could not be read; only the EEA framework can be stated |
| Italy | Euronext Milan, STAR, Growth Milan | Consob | Permissive | Civil Code art. 2441: no pricing floor, but Consob Richiamo 14/25 governs conduct |
| Spain | Bolsa de Madrid (SIBE), BME Growth | CNMV | Constrained | LSC: fair value presumed only within 10% of the quoted price |
| Portugal | Euronext Lisbon, Access | CMVM | Constrained | CSC art. 460: the board must publish the price and the criteria used |
| Greece | ATHEX Main Market, EN.A. | HCMC | Constrained | Law 4548/2018 art. 71: a conversion range must be voted; par is a hard floor |
| Poland | GPW Main Market, NewConnect | KNF | Permissive | KSH art. 433: the resolution may state the method of determining the price |
| Czech Republic | Prague Stock Exchange, START | Czech National Bank | Constrained | ZOK s.488: pre-emption excluded only in an important interest of the company |
| Hungary | Budapest Stock Exchange, Xtend | MNB | Constrained | Civil Code: a closed-circle increase must name the subscriber in the resolution |
| Romania | Bucharest Stock Exchange, AeRO | ASF | Constrained | Law 31/1990 arts. 92 and 216: a nominal-value floor plus a one-month preference period |
| Turkey | Borsa Istanbul | CMB (SPK) | Constrained | Pay Tebligi VII-128.1: allocated increases priced at a floor, not a discount |
| Israel | TASE; many issuers dual-listed on Nasdaq | ISA | Constrained | Securities Law s.15C: a six-month block, then six quarters of capped selling |
| United Arab Emirates | DFM, ADX (onshore) | CMA (formerly SCA) | Closed | Commercial Companies Law: the regulator consents and prescribes the premium formula |
| Saudi Arabia | Saudi Exchange (Tadawul), Nomu | CMA | Constrained | ROSCO: a 15% conversion ceiling and one private placement per twelve months |
| Qatar | Qatar Stock Exchange, QEVM | QFMA | Closed | Board Decision 8 of 2025: every offering approved individually, no refixing regime |
| Kuwait | Boursa Kuwait | CMA Kuwait | Closed | Companies Law 1/2016: an assembly resolution fixes the amount and manner of every increase |
| Australia | ASX | ASIC, ASX | Permissive | ASX Listing Rule 7.1: 15% placement capacity, plus 10% under Rule 7.1A |
| New Zealand | NZX Main Board | FMA, NZX | Constrained | NZX Rule 4.11.1(e): conversion at least 85% of Average Market Price |
| South Africa | JSE; A2X, Cape Town Stock Exchange | JSE, FSCA | Constrained | JSE: maximum 10% discount to the 30-business-day VWAP, measured at issue |
| Nigeria | NGX, NASD OTC | SEC Nigeria | Closed | Securities are registered and the offer documents approved before the offer is made |
| Kenya | Nairobi Securities Exchange | CMA Kenya | Closed | 2023 Regulations: private offers capped at 100 investors, 24-month repeat bar |
| Egypt | EGX, Nilex | FRA | Closed | Companies Law 159/1981: the extraordinary general assembly fixes the price |
| Morocco | Bourse de Casablanca | AMMC | Closed | Loi 17-95: only the AGE may lift the DPS and fix the issue price |
| Japan | TSE Prime, Standard, Growth | FSA, JPX | Constrained | TSE Rule 434: conversion capped at 10% of listed shares per calendar month |
| South Korea | KOSPI, KOSDAQ, KONEX | FSC, FSS | Constrained | Issuance Regulation art. 5-23: refixing floored at 70% of the initial price |
| China | Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing | CSRC | Closed | CSRC refinancing rules: not below 80% of the 20-trading-day average |
| Hong Kong | HKEX Main Board, GEM | SFC, HKEX | Constrained | Rule 13.36(5) and (6): initial conversion price within 20% of the benchmark |
| Taiwan | TWSE, TPEx | FSC | Closed | Securities and Exchange Act art. 43-8: private placements frozen for three years |
| India | NSE, BSE, NSE Emerge, BSE SME | SEBI | Closed | ICDR reg. 164: not below the higher of the 90-day and 10-day VWAP |
| Singapore | SGX Mainboard, Catalist | MAS, SGX RegCo | Permissive | Mainboard Rule 811: maximum 10% discount to the full-day VWAP at signing |
| Malaysia | Bursa Malaysia Main, ACE, LEAP | SC, Bursa | Constrained | Bursa Chapter 6: a 10% mandate and a 10% cap on the discount to the VWAMP |
| Indonesia | Indonesia Stock Exchange | OJK | Constrained | POJK 38/2014: non-pre-emptive increases capped at 10% of paid-up capital |
| Thailand | SET, mai | SEC Thailand | Constrained | SET: below 90% of market price triggers a one-year silent period |
| Philippines | PSE Main Board, SME Board | SEC Philippines, PSE | Constrained | PSE Article V: a 10% to 35% creeping issue needs a rights or public offering |
| Vietnam | HOSE, HNX, UPCoM | SSC | Closed | Decree 155/2020: privately placed stock restricted for one to three years |
| Pakistan | Pakistan Stock Exchange | SECP | Constrained (provisional) | Further Issue of Shares Regulations 2020: special resolution plus a valuation |
| Sri Lanka | CSE Main, Diri Savi, Empower | SEC Sri Lanka | Constrained (provisional) | CSE Listing Rules Section 5: further issues are discrete, approved events |
| Bangladesh | DSE, CSE Chittagong | BSEC | Closed | A BSEC consent regime, a distribution quota and a lock-in on converted stock |
| Screened August 2026 and current at that date only. Rulebooks change and several items screened are proposals, not law. Provisional marks a verdict that rests on an absence of located evidence rather than on a rule we can name: the market has not been established either way, and the tier should be read as a holding position. General information, not legal advice, and not an offer, a quote, or a rate card. | ||||
Permissive: 12 markets
The structure works substantially as intended, subject to normal capacity and disclosure rules. That is a statement about law, not desirability: France, Italy and Belgium sit in three different tiers, yet all three regulators have published findings on what these instruments did to the issuers that used them.
- United States
- United Kingdom
- Ireland
- France
- Netherlands
- Luxembourg
- Italy
- Sweden
- Norway
- Poland
- Australia
- Singapore
Constrained: 32 markets
The structure works only with a material modification, and the modification differs sharply. Germany's is a par-value floor at every conversion, Japan's a 10% monthly conversion cap, Israel's a resale block, Saudi Arabia's a 15% dilution ceiling, New Zealand's a capped discount in the listing rules.
- Canada
- Brazil
- Mexico
- Peru
- Argentina
- Germany
- Belgium
- Switzerland
- Austria
- Denmark
- Finland
- Iceland
- Spain
- Portugal
- Greece
- Czech Republic
- Hungary
- Romania
- Turkey
- Israel
- Saudi Arabia
- New Zealand
- South Africa
- Japan
- South Korea
- Hong Kong
- Malaysia
- Indonesia
- Thailand
- Philippines
- Pakistan
- Sri Lanka
Closed: 14 markets
Market-referenced conversion pricing is effectively unavailable, or capital controls and approval architecture make the structure impractical for an outside investor. These pages exist to say so plainly and to set out what is possible instead. They are not sales pages.
- Chile
- Colombia
- United Arab Emirates
- Qatar
- Kuwait
- Nigeria
- Kenya
- Egypt
- Morocco
- China
- Taiwan
- India
- Vietnam
- Bangladesh
Four patterns worth knowing before you read a page
A minimum price is the commonest way a market closes
India, China and Taiwan each compute a floor from a past trading average and forbid issuing beneath it. A conversion price that refixes downward is not a discount to that floor, it is a breach of it, so no drafting solves the problem. Colombia goes further and requires a stated price in a pre-approved subscription regulation.
Par value is a hidden floor, and it binds the issuers who need this most
Germany, Greece, Romania, Kuwait and Colombia floor the issue price at nominal value. A company whose shares have fallen far enough to need a facility is often trading below its own par, which makes the structure unlawful until it reduces capital or reverse-splits. That is a separate corporate action, and it comes first.
Pre-emption decides Europe; capacity decides Asia-Pacific
In Chile, Argentina, Portugal, Austria and the Czech Republic the argument is whether shareholders' subscription rights can be lifted at all, and on what majority. In Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia it is how much stock is left inside a standing mandate. Both settle before price.
The exit is a separate screen from the entry
Israel, Taiwan, Vietnam, China and Bangladesh all permit a placement and then immobilise the resulting stock. Thailand meters the lock to the discount: price below 90% of market and a one-year silent period attaches. Where economics depend on recycling capital, the resale rule is the binding one.
Working note
A listing here is a statement of law, not of capability or appetite. Publishing a market page does not mean we transact in that market, hold any licence there, or have done business there. Several pages exist to explain why the structure does not work locally, and a constrained or closed page says so rather than offering a workaround.
General information, not legal advice. This directory and the market pages beneath it describe statutes, listing rules and resale mechanics in general terms, at a point in time, and several entries carry items the screen could not verify against a primary source. Rules change, and application turns on facts specific to the issuer. Take advice from qualified securities counsel in the relevant jurisdiction before acting on anything here.
Where to go next
If the market is settled and the structure is not, start at the instruments hub and its comparison matrix, or with the two that travel furthest: convertible notes for listed issuers and standby and committed equity facilities. For the United States, resale is the harder half: read the Rule 144 pillar on restricted securities, resale registration on Form S-1, and whether you qualify.
- Registered direct offerings
- How a PIPE transaction works
- Dilution and conversion mechanics
- Capital raising for listed companies
- Discuss a financing
Primary sources
- Nasdaq Listing Rule 5635 and IM-5635-4, Future Priced Securities
- SEBI ICDR Regulations 2018 — preferential issue pricing
- Consob Richiamo di attenzione 14/25 on non-standard convertible bond loans
- AMF study on companies using dilutive OCABSA and equity-line financing
- FSMA communication on convertible bonds issued by companies needing financing
- Aktiengesetz section 186 — exclusion of subscription rights
- Companies Act 2006 section 560 — equity securities and conversion rights
- Finanstilsynet on private placements and equal treatment of shareholders
The market directory: frequently asked questions
Where is a convertible with a market-referenced conversion price actually permitted?
Twelve of the 58 markets screened are permissive, meaning the structure works substantially as intended subject to normal capacity and disclosure rules. Thirty-two are constrained: they permit it only with a material modification such as a pricing floor, a capped discount, a mandatory shareholder vote, a dilution ceiling or a lock-up. Fourteen are closed.
What makes a market closed rather than merely constrained?
One of two things. Either a mandatory pricing formula makes a floating or refixing conversion price unlawful, which is the position in India, China and Taiwan. Or the structure survives on paper and dies in practice, because capital controls, distribution quotas or multi-year transfer restrictions stop an outside investor recycling capital.
Does a market appearing here mean you fund issuers in it?
No. A market page is a statement of law, not of capability or of appetite. Many of these pages exist to explain why the structure is unavailable and what an issuer there might do instead. Nothing on this site is an offer, and no transaction is agreed until definitive documents are signed.
Which single question matters most before terms are discussed?
Whether the price can still move after signing. In the United States that is a shareholder-approval test rather than a formula. In India, China and Taiwan it is a mandatory minimum price. In Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore it is placement capacity read together with a maximum discount.
How current is this screen?
Every market page carries a published date and a last reviewed date, and the screen behind it is dated to the same review. Rulebooks in this field move quickly, several items screened are proposals rather than law, and every threshold must be checked against the primary source before anyone relies on it.
Talk to us
Start with the exchange, not the amount.
The venue and its rulebook decide half the structure before size is discussed. Send the listing, the free float, average daily traded value and any issuance mandate still unused, and we will come back on what is available in that market.